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AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH TO
PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT
An unprecedented dilemma confronts today's pension asset manager.

Tradi-

tionally, most of these managers believed that the ability to select undervalued securities was the secret to earning high returns.

Accordingly, funda-

mental securities analysis prevailed as the predominant investment management
theory for use in portfolio construction.
Recently, however, another school has emerged that presents. a robust
challenge to the very foundation of fundamental analysis.

Many academicians,

backed by elaborate computer documentation, contend that securities markets
have become so fiercely competitive that one no longer can find undervalued
securities.

This "efficient market hypothesis" (EMH), one of the main tenets

held by many subscribers to modern portfolio theory (MPT), asserts that securities are priced "fairly," and thus in the long run an investor cannot make
above-average profits without being exposed to a corresponding high risk of
loss.l
Both fundamental analysis and MPT claim numerous devoted followers, and
it is generally recognized that the subscription to one theory precludes the
belief in the other.

So

wher~

does this place the pension fund manager?

Charged on the one hand with the responsibility of prudently managing fund assets and on the other confronted· with the choice between two conflicting investment theories, the perplexed manager often does not know which direction
to turn.

If he adopts the fundamental analysis approach, he may be attempting

to achieve a higher than average return while exposing his fund to higher than
tolerable risk.

But if he adheres to MPT, he foregoes the possibility of

earning abnormally high returns since his role is confined merely to selecting
the proper risk/return tradeoff and diversifying to attain that relationship.

2

In this article. we shall demonstrate that, unlike popular belief suggests, fundamental securities analysis and MPT are not necessarily incompatible.

In fact, we introduce a hybrid action strategy that is based on a syn-

thesis· of the pertinent. features of both fundamental analysis and MPT.

This

strategy, called Interactive Portfolio· Management (UM), gives rise to. a unified management approach that relieves the manager from the difficult and limiting decision of choosing between two opposing theories, thus allowing him to
concentrate on the task at hand -- optimizing the pension plan's investment
performance•

In order to better understand this asset management theory, it

will be valuable to first trace the plight of the pension manager.
Until the 1970's, pension· fund asset managers had more: flexibility than
virtually any other type of investor.

They were· unfettered by cUttlbersome laws

and, due to tax exemption, free· to switch among assets without regard to tax
consequences.

Their long-term investment horizon enabled them to seek higher

returns in more aggressive, less· liquid assets.

At the same time, the· stock

market was experiencing one of its longest and most dramatic "bull"' movements.
From the end of World· War II to year-end 1970, common stocks yielded an 18
percent comp.o und annual. return (cash dividends plus price appreciation),. almost fourfold the rate of inflation over that same period. 2

One can easily

see why many investors viewed equities as the "perfect inflation hedge."
Pension investmentmanagers recognized the potential: benefits of common
stock ownership.

Many managers. aggressively accumulated. stocks, realizing

that continued high returns from these securities would reduce the amount of
money the companymust. expend to satisfy its pension obligations.

As

are-

sult, private pensions' holdings of corporate equities, which totaled less
than one billion dollars in 1945, surged to over $67 billion by 1970,
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representing approximately two-thirds of total pension assets.3

Many com-

panies ,. in effect, relied on the performance of their pension's equity portfolio to subsidize corporate contributions.
Most asset managers used fundamental securities analysis to select intrinsically undervalued stocks,. believing that eventually these securities
would be "recognized" and thus propelled to higher prices.

A securities ana-

lyst prepares an estimate of intrinsic value by multiplying his estimate of
the stock's earnings per share times an appropriate earnings multiplier.

If a

stock's market price is below its intrinsic value, it is underpriced and
should be bought and held in order to reap future capital gains.

In this

sense, fundamental analysis concentrates primarily on the expected· return of a
security, sometimes devoting only cursory attention to the riskiness of the
security.
As the stock market continued to prosper, an increasing number of pension
managers became confident that the selection of intrinsically undervalued
stocks was the. most effective asset management approach.

Attention continued

to be focusedon the generousexpected return potential of equities; few bothered to consider the risk that stocks. might relinquish some· of their mounting
price gains.

Prosperity abounded among equity-oriented pension managers.

But unfortunately the· environment for the pension asset manager changed.
The 1970's, in particular, were significant for three reasons:

(1) the Em-

ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was ushered in, (2) the
stock market nose-divedapproximately 40 percent during 1973-1974, and (l) the
emergence ofMPT threatened the existence of traditional securities analysis.
Each of these important occurrences and its impact on the pension asset manager is initially examined.
management approach -

Then we present the interactive pension asset

one that incorporates the key features of traditional
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securities analysis, yet is responsive to the heightened fiduciary responsibility confronting managers and the increased emphasis placed on gauging the
relative riskiness of alternative investment assets.
Advent of ERISA
Pension managers, as well as other fiduciaries, for years have been required to exercise good judgment, or prudence as the legal profession labels
it, in their investment decisions.

As distantly as 1830, the courts defined a

fiduciary's responsibility in managing funds "to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the possible income as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested."4

Until 1974, a fiduciary continued to be required to perform like a

man of ordinary prudence in dealing with his own property.
However, the passage of ERISA in 1974 significantly changed prudence demands.

A stringent new standard emerged mandating that fiduciaries act "with

the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in conducting an enterprise of like character and like aims. ·• 5

In

other words, the criterion for comparison is now not what a prudent private
investor would do with his own investments, but what. the professional pension
manager would do under like circumstances.

In essence, ERISA invokes a pru-

dent "expert" standard, replacing the prude!'lt man criterion.

It turns the

limelight on a basis of comparisons -- handling a pension fund by knowledgeable people using the highest techniques of asset management applicable to
pension funds.
The implications of ERISA's new prudence requirements are striking.
Since fund managers are now personally liable for losses caused by imprudent
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decisions, many may elect to invest more conservatively, placing less emphasis
. on riskier equities and paring overall risk by subscribing to the principle of
asset diversification.
Stock Market Collapse

.

At approximately the same time that ERISA appeared, stocks were experiencing the worst "bear" market since the days of the Great Depression.

Pen-

sion managers, who had. grown accustomed to the buoyant stock returns of the
'fifties and 'sixties, were heavily committed to equities --especially those
of large growth companies.

Many managers theorized that no matter how much

you paid for one of these elite issues, you would eventually prosper because
growth would always bail you out.

As a result, prices of growth stocks esca-

lated to dizzying heights. · In 1972, stocks of companies such as Avon, Disney
and Polaroid, for example, sold at exorbitant prices in excess of 80 times
earnings.

"Pte 1973-74 market collapse was especially cruel to. these institu-

tional favorites..

By 1974, Avon, Disney and Polaroid had lost more than

eighty percent of their peak market values.

Even regal IBM, the epitome of a

"one-decision" stock (you only buy them), had more than half of its value
lopped off.
The market decline severely reduced pension fund values and significantly
shook asset managers' confidence in equities.

Furthermore, coming on the

heels of ERISA, the stock market. retreat causedmany managers to reassess
their attitudes toward risk.

They realized that under ERISA increased risk in

plan assets translated into more personal risk.

However, no generally ac-

cepted measure of an asset's riskiness existed.

Thus, pension managers were

caught in the teeth of a very frustrating dilemma.

On one hand, they desired

to optimize the risk/return balance of their portfolios, but on the other

6

hand, they had no satisfactory way toquantify risk.

Fearful that they might

be challenged for exposing a plan to excessive risk, many managers took the
path of least resi.stance -- they minimized risk by concentrating their acqui. si.tions to low risk alternatives suchcas high-grade bonds and money market
instruments.

Others· sti.ll purchased equities, but in a manner that "indexed"

their portfolios to the market -- thus ensuring that they would never underperform the market (nor, for that matter, would they ever beat it).
The combination of ERISA's more stringent attitude toward risk-taking and
the unsettling experience of a major stock market decline apparently caused
many pension asset. managers to become very risk averse --possibly handicapping, their plans.' long-run productivity..

A notion existed: that the riskier an

asset, the greater should be its return, but with no detailed specifications
concerning how· one· ought to view risK;Emergence of MPT
Already frustrated by cumbersomenewERISA requirements and a broad-based
stock market retreat, pension asset managers were further consternated by the·
increasing attention that MPT was receiving.

Until the arrival of MPT, most

managers believed that the ability to. select undervalued securities would open
the door to high stock market . gains.
mental belief.

But MPT strongly challenges that funda-

MPTdisciples observed that stock prices seemed to follow no

predictable pattern.

In this manner, a blindfolded baboon throwing darts at

the financial pages of· the Wall Street Journal should, on average, be able to
pick stocks as successfully as a professional portfolio manager.

Even though

this viewpoint appears very extreme, many researchers endorsed this so-called
"random walk" theory, pointing out that this is really the way the securities
markets should function.

After all, if a stock's price reflects everything

that is known about the security (past, present and future), then any new

T
informa.t ion would' come as a complete surprise.

And a surprise is just as

likely to be an undesirable one as it is to be a pleasant one (or vice versa) •.
As a result, if current. stock prices. reflect all known information, then price
behavior, which responds only to new information, should be essentially ran-·
dom•,

The implication is obvious:

if stock prices follow a kind of random

walk, then it would be· fruitless to attempt to uncover presently undervalued
stocks -- they simply do · not exist because the market is too efficient to permit such an occurrence.
The new theory goes even further:

since individual stock price movements

are unpredictableand random, the asset manager should strive to eliminate
this type of undesirable firm-specific risk through diversification.

The·

diversification co.n cept may be portrayed by observing the indexing technique.
An investor who. acquires a portfolio that exactly replicates a selected market

indicator (the Standard & Poor's '500', for example) has obviously pegged or
"indexed'• his portfoli-o's performance to that of the market.

Since the· in-

dexed portfoli-o isthe· market, i-ndividual (firm-specific) risk is nonexistent
only market risk remains.
MPT hypothes·izes that a rational, risk-averse asset manager, desiring to
achieve a · given expected return level, should construct the unique portfolio
that possesses the lowest. degree of risk for that particular return object!*·
This unique portfolio is known as an "efficient" portfolio. because no other
combination of stocks can be devised tha.t produces the desired expected return
level for as small a degree of risk.

The only way to create an efficient

portfolio is via diversification so that unnecessary firm-specific risk is
eliminated.
It is certainly not surprising that portfolio managers found MPT to be
extremelyunnerving.

If securities analysis is a futile practice (as market
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efficiency implies),. then the very profession of the securities analyst is in
jeopardy.

Rather than actively managing a portfolio, the asset manager should

assume a relatively passive posture -- making portfolio alterations only to
change a portfolio's risk/return composition.
the beta coefficient, emerged from MPT.6

Fortunately, a new risk gauge,

Now the asset manager has a.specific

tool for quantifying portfolio risk, thus mitigating some of the concern that
was previously associated with portfolio risk measurement.
How Efficient Is the Market?
It becomes readily apparent that the increasing number of subscribers to
the EMH implies greater suspicion of the merits of fundamental securities
analysis.

If markets are completely efficient, fundamentally over- or under-

valued securities do not exist.

In recent years, however, . an expanding con-

tingency of researchers have questioned the validity of the EMH, asking "Are
securities. in all markets efficiently priced . at all times?"

A negative re-

sponse· to that query· would, of course, indicate that at some point. in time
abnormal returns could be attained.
In particular, several academicians challenged the EMH.

As

a result,

many empirical studies designed to test market efficiency emerged.

Some re-

searchers discovered persistent market anomalies which are inconsistent with
the EMH assertions -- suggesting that abnormal returns, although very difficult to achieve, are indeed possible.

One anomaly that has received consider-

able recent attention is the price-earnings (P/E) ratio effect.

Recent

studies reveal that, on average, portfolios consisting of low P/E stocks yield
higher returns than justified by their underlying beta risk.7
analysis which follows confirms this anomaly.

The empirical

An Empirical Investigation

In this study a sample of 125 randomly-selected industrial companies was

analyzed to determine if the P/E effect. persisted during the. trying 1970's.
Relevant return and accounting data were retrieved from the COMPUSTAT tapes.
Initially the P/E ratio for acll sample firms was calculated quarterly from the
beginning of 1970 to mid-year 1980.

The stocks were ranked in ascending order

by their respective P/E magnitudes so that the lowest quintile (Ql) includes
firms with the lowest P/E . ratios and the highest quintile (QS) consists of the
highest P/E's.

The quarterly portfolio mean excess return for each quintile

was then calculated. assuming an equal initial investment in each stock.s
This procedure was repeated; at each quarter's end, thus providing 42 consecutive· quarters of return data;. for each of the five PIE-ranked portfolios.
Thus, the composition; of each portfolio was adjusted quarterly to reflect
shifts in relative P/E rankings.
The systematic risk coefficients (betas) were averaged across the firms
within each portfolio· to estimate the portfolio's systematic risk (Bpt) in
in period t ,. as follows:

where npt is the number of stocks in portfolio pin period t.

Each quarterly

excess portfolio return (r'pt> was obtained by· averaging cross-sectionally the
excess returns of the individual stocks belonging to the particular portfolio,

r

'

pt

1

=--

r

' it
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In this; manner, the mean excess returns were· computed for each of the P/E.
quintiles for a series of 42' consecutive quarters..

Finally,, the geome·tric

mean excess return for each. P/E: quintile over the entire· 10 1/2 year period
was. computed..

The results are shown in Exhibit 1.
(Insert Exhibit l Here)

Over· tha entire period'; . a significant P/E effect was detected.

As in

prior studies,. low P/E portfolios; were found . to significantly outperform the
average return.

In fact, excess returns decline monotonically as portfolio

average P/E increases.

'lhesefindings confirm that stock market anomalies

continue: to• exist, even though the: institutionally-dominated markets. have no
doubt become' more efficient in·. absorbing,. processing and reacting to· relevant
information. 9'
An Interactive Asset Management Approach

In this section, we outline: anasset management approach based. on the in:teraction· and synthesis of fundamental analysis with MP'r.
approach resol.v es: the basic conflict of the· asset manager.
ples wilL be synthesized.

This interactive
Three key princi-

From .fundamental. analysis we draw · upon the idea of

the existence· of market anomalies in a nearly efficient market..
will apply two crucial notions.
measure, beta..

From MPT we

'lhe first is the idea of an objective risk

'lhe second is the concept of eliminating individual stock risk

via proper diversification •. Thesethreeprinciples . blended into an action
st.rategy comprise Interactive Portfolio. Management (IPM).
Since several empirical studies have detected. market inefficiencies, it
follows that the securities analyst may not be as obsolete as the EMH asserts •.
But these same studies also reveal that market inefficiencies are scarce and '
difficult to uncover.

An aggressive, knowledgeable analyst may be able to

discover: intrinsically undervalued· securities·, but it certainly is not easy.
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Thus, the job of today's portfolio manager becomes somewhat clearer.

In

a "nearly" efficient market it is prudent to rely on the advice of superior
securities' analysts because it is reasonable to assume that in the long run
these top-notch analysts can detect securities that are intrinsically
misvalued.

This, in turn, indicates that the use of fundamental analysis is

still a viable alternative- for the asset manager -

a nearly efficient market

provides enough investment opportunities to justify the securities analyst's
existence.
The empirical evidence cited earlier in this article reveals that low P/E
stocks provided abnormally .generous rates of return during the 1970-1980 period.

This anomaly is inconsistent with the notion that the securities markets

are totally efficient, but are compatible with the idea of nearly efficient
markets.

One would thus think that the purchase of low P/E issues would be a

prudent way for the asset. manager to construct an attractive portfolio.

Un-

fortunately it is not that simple. because the creation of a portfolio in this
manner virtually ignores the concept of risk.

Whereas such a portfolio might

have a very high return expectation, it could also possess a very large degree
of risk --more than the plan beneficiaries are willing to tolerate.10

A

major criticism of fundamental analysis revolves around its purportedly inadequate treatment of portfolio risk.
This is substantiated by a further look at the results of Exhibit 1.
Note that for the lowest P/E stocks, the average beta levels are significantly
above 1.0.

This means that diversified portfolios consisting of low P/E se-

curities could indeed expose the asset manager to high risk..

The portfolio

would yield expected returns above those warranted by its risk; nevertheless,
the risk of the portfolio could be substantially greater than the market risk.

12
Exhibit 1 implies that higher than justified returns.· are achieved at the
expense· of' high. risk, a . very serious: drawback.
a : second empirical experiment was performed.

To test the validity· of this,
In this experiment all low P/E

stocks were classified into - five beta risk categories.

Quintile I contains

the 20%·· least. risky stocks,. qUintile 2: the 20% least risky stocks and so on.
The same 42 quarters were used with the returns compounded over this period.
All returns were then adjusted in accordance with their beta risk levels.
This experiment should reveal whether it is necessary to select high risk
stocks in order to achieve excess returns.

Exhibit Z presents these findings.

First note that the risk-adjusted returns arevirtually the same for all. beta
quintiles.

Thi:s: confirms the· risk-return tennant of MPT.

riskF all returns should be the· same.

After adjusting. for

Of course, the returns of high beta

stocks are larger in the absolute•. (non:-risk-adjusted) sense.
(Insert EXhibit 2 Here,) '
Exhibit 2 reveals a · dramatic. and' crucial. result:
yields substantial excess returns> over the· average..

every beta quintile
This means that low· P/E'

stocks;. of any beta risk level produced' abnormally high returns.
turns. higher than. the average · of stocks at that same beta level.

That is, reTherefore,.

i .t : is not necessary to hold only high risk stocks in. order to obtain exceptional performance.
Although fundamental analysis has recently received· considerable empirical support.,. it nonetheless cannot be practiced in a vacuum.

At this point. we

introduce the concept of Interactive- Portfolio Management (IPM) --a blending
of fundamental analysis and MPT.
Fundamental analysis is designed to facilitate the selection of undervalued securities,. but it does not thoroughlydiscuss . howto package those individual stocks..

Exhibit 3 illustrates that: a fundamental approach which
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analyzes stocks' P/E ratios may be employed to select specific undervalued securities.

That same' Exhibit shows. that MPT should also enter the scene in

order to enable the asset manager to package the individual. securities into an
efficient portfolio..

This is the major departure from traditional portfolio

management which primarily focuses on the selection of individual stocks, as
opposed to the construction of an individual, efficient portfolio.
(Insert Exhibit 3 Here)
MPT mounts a head-on attack to the: problem of risko

The theory contends

that risk has two crucial components.. 'lhe first component, called unsystematic or individual stock risk, can be reduced or even eliminated via divers:lfication, but thee second· component, known as systematic or market risk, is
non-diversifiable.)1

An investor cannot escape systematic risk, bt;tt he can

regulate its intensity by effective analysis.

The degree of portfolio risk is

measured by· the· portfolio's beta' which is merely a weighted average of the
individual component: securities' betas ..12
Furthermore·, MPT assumes that investors: are risk ave·rse, i.e.,. f .o r a desired return level a rational. investor always prefers. the least. risky (efficient) portfolio that: promises that return expectation.

After determining the

investor's risk tolerance level, the portfolio manager's task is to select the
unique portfolio possessing that risk level with the highest possible return
expectation.

The adherence to MPT's risk quantification technique enables the

asset manager to design a portfolio that has exactly the desired amount of
systematic risk (unsystematic risk is not relevant since it can be diversified
away).

No longer· does the manager have to fear the consequences of not prop-

erly risk-designing a portfolio.
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The Capital Market Line (CML) summarizes- the relationship between portfolio - risk and return·, and in- this instance is; represented' by" the· line segment
_RfMA.

Point M' on the CML represents the overall market; thus, E(Rut) is the

expected market return and am is the market's risk level. 13

If market effi-

ciency prevails,, _ portfolio M is the only portfolio of. risky securities which
should be held -because it is the one portfolio which possesses zero unsystemati'c risk.

The line segment RfM indicates the various returns available

through the combination of commitments in risk-free assets and risky assets as
represented by the· market index..

In order to achieve an expected return

greater than the market, some point along; that portion of the CML between M
and: A, the· investor is· assumed able·· to - borrow at the- risk-free rate, and thus;
.

-

"leverage" the portfolio by reinvesting the borrowed funds in the market.
(Insert Exhibit 4 Here)
_In a ' world· of efficient markets, rational investors would always strive·
to own . portfolios- falling along the- CML . -- all other possibilities would be·
inefficient..

The relaxation of the EMil assumption,. however, could dramatical-

ly change:· investors} out.look.

For· example" if one believes• that low P/E

stocks,. on average, yield abnormally highreturns, then that individual may
prefer to move off the CML.

Such a . departure from the CML could be accom-

t

pl.i shed by acquiring a diversified. portfolio consisting· of many low P/E firms •.
This· acquisition of' undervaluedsecurites wouldcreate a . higher than normal
return expectation...

And, through proper diversification, unsystematic risk-

could be essentially negated.
presumably only at

a

Market risk, of course, would still exist, but

level approximatingthat of the overall market.

In fact,

the por.tfolio manager could monitor the portfolio's mean beta to ensure that·
an average degree of systematic risk (6 =- l. 0) · emerges •.
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This is the essence of IPM.

In this manner, the new diversified portfo-

lio (denoted as point X in Exhibit 4) would replace the market index as a viable combination of risky assets.l4

In fact, the market portfolio would no

longer be a relevant alternative because at the same risk level it indicates a
lower return expectation than does the new, anomaly-based portfolio.

The

superior portfolio of risky assets could be used in combination with the riskfree asset to create a new CML (designated CML' in Exhibit 4) which would
supersede the original CML.
sented in Exhibit 2.

CML' is a graphic display of the results pre-

Therefore, return expectations would be higher, but, due

to diversification, unsystematic risk would be substantially eliminated, basically leaving only market risk exposure.

The composite effect of IPM is to.

provide the investor ahigher return expectation at each respective beta risk
level.
Putting it all together, the IPM strategy can be implemented by the
following action steps:
(1) Select a desired beta risk level for the portfolio.

(2) Compile a master list of low P/E stocks and their respective betas.
(3) Adjust the portfolio to obtain a broad diversification of stocks which refleets the composition of the market.
(4) Borrow or lend funds at the risk-free rate to adjust the portfolio's risk/
(

return characteristics.
(5) Review and rebalance the portfolio at regular intervals in order to maintain the necessary P/E, beta, and diversity traits.
The procedure enables the asset manager to achieve any desired point along the
CML' line of Exhibit 4 by synthesizing the key features of fundamental
analysis and MPT.
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Conclusion
The:past decade was; fraught with change' for the typical pension fund
ass.e t manager.

The broad-based stock market retreat, the rigid standards set

forth by ERISA, and the emergence of MPTcombined to threaten the practice of
. t .raditional asset. management.

In particular, these changes collectively led

to, an increased emphasis on the riskiness; of. assets --no, longer could return
expectations be the· dominant consideration.,

Fearful of the adverse conse-

quences - of excessive risk exposure, some managers resorted to techniques such
as indexing in order to avoid being criticized for taking too much risk..

In

essence, the- pendulum shif.ted from return; consciousness to risk conscious-

This ' article asserts, that neither r .e turn nor risk should. be the predominant~

asset. management

consideration~

equal emphasis on each factor.

Rather the prudent manager should place

An approach called Interactive· Portfolio Man-

agement is; introduced to . capture the- important elements- of both expected return, and' risk'"'

IPM is really nothing more· thana synthesise of the important

features·: of tradi tiona! securities.

anal~sis'

and. modern portfolio theory, and

as> such is: designed to enable the. manager. tor achieve· the highest return
expectation for a given risk level..

In this manner, the skills of the superi-

or securities analyst are· still valuable for selecting undervalued securitiet;.
But at. the same time the principles· of MPT are· meritorious· -- one should employ effective asset diversification among undervalued securitesin order to
mitigate' overall portfolio risk •.
· The· use of IPM: allows the asse.t manager to be responsive: to the major
tenets of both fundamental securities analysis and MP'f.

Thus, two seemingly

contradictory theories areharmoniously blended to achieve a mutual objective .
-- opt.i mizing a portfolio's risk/ return. composition.

EXHIBiT 1

ANNUAL PORTFOLIO MEAN EXCESS RETURNS AND BETAS

Portfolio
Quintile

P/E Ratio Ranking
Beta
Excess Return

Q1

11.20

1. 05

Q2

6.04

1.01

Q3

-1.88

0.97

Q4

-5.68

I. 00

Q5

-9.68

1.06

F-Statistic

12.98

Significance

.01

EXHIBIT 2
ANNUAL MEAN EXCESS RETURNS OF LOW P/E STOCKS

Beta Quintile

Excess Return

Mean Beta

Q1

10.93

0.78

Q2

10. 9'7

0.95

Q3

11.35

1. 04

Q4

11.61

1•.13

QS

11.17

1.35
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Footnotes
lAn efficie~t market is one in which prices always fully reflect all
available relevant· information. Adjustment to new information is vi:rtually
instantaneous.
2see Roger G. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and
Inflation: Historical Returns (1926-1978). Charlottesville, VA: Financial
Analysts Research Foundation, 1979.
3Pensions and' the Economy, Washington, D.C.:
Institute,- 1982.

Employee Benefit Research

4Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.), 446, 461 (1830).
5see Robert W. Murphy, "Interpreting the New Prudent Man Standard Introduced by ERISA," I.C~F .A. Seminar on ERISA, January 1976.
6The beta, coefficient measures a security's market risk, i.e., the security;'s risk relative to that of the overall market. A beta of 1.0 signifies a
risk. level comparable to the markets, whereas a B )1.0 denotes greaterthan-market risk and a. B < 1. b indicates lower-than-market risk. One should
note that beta does not gauge the finn'""Specific risk of a. stock.
7see- S. Basu, "Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation- to
Their Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis,"
JournaL of Finance, June 1977, pp. 663-682, for an analysis of the P/E effect.
See Rolf W. Banz, ,;The Relationship Between Return and- Market Value of Common
Stocks," Journal: of Financial Economics, March 1981, pp. 3-18 and Marc R.
Reinganum, "Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies
Based on Earnings Yield and Market Values," Journal of Financial Economics,.
March 1981, pp •. 2T-35, for a discussion of the market capitalization anoma-ly.
8The excess return (r'it) of an individual stock (i) in period t is
calculated by subtracting the stock's expected return, E(rit), from its actual
return for a given- period given that:

where- rft_ =risk-free rate for period t;
Bit =- systematic (beta) risk for stock i forperiod t; and
rint =, market return for period t •.
For purposes of this study excess returns were risk-adjusted by dividing each
stock's or portfolio's excess return by its beta coefficient, i.e., r 'it/ Sf.
9A more detailed explanation of these findings is available in John W.
Peavy III andDavid A. Goodman, "A Further Inquiry into the Market Value and
Earnings' Yield Anomalies," Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance
Conference, October 1982 •.

lOFor example,,, on average, portfolios consisting of low P/E stocks possess - low systematic (beta} risk, but small capitalization firms' portfolios.
have high beta risk. Thus~ although each portfolio has produced abnormal returns, it has not done so at equal risk. levels.
liThe· risk-reduction effect of dive.rsification occurs rapidly as· additional stocks are added to a portfolio. Empirical findings' show that a
randomly-selected 20-security portfolio is 89%. correlated with the overall
market, implying: that specific firm , risk accounts for only 11% of the portfolio's risk. see: w·•. H·. Wagner and s. Lau,. "The Effect of Diversification andr
Risk,," Financial Analysts Journal,. November-December 19/1, pp. 48-53•.
12Beta is a proxy only for systematic risk; thus it is: most useful when
applied to substantially diversified portfolios which have insignificant
unsystematic risk exposure.
.

.

,

.

13The CML uses the• st,andard deviation of returns for a portfolio (ap)' as
a: risk gaug~; however,, when, diversified· portfolios are being evaluated,. beta

would be an equally· acceptable. risk surrogate so that Bm= 1.0.
14This new. index would require· conti.n ual updating as: the· P/E's· of the'
various securites.. change,. thus creating a . more instable index than would be
the· case· with an overall. market index.
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